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THE FAIR TRADE ACTS AND THE LAW OF 
RESTRICTIVE AGREEMENTS AFFECTING CHATTELS 
By HARRY SHULMAN t 
THE outstanding facts about the Fair Trade Acts are that they were 
passed in a short period of time in 44 states,l that they have been declared 
tLines Professor of Law, Yale Law School. 
This Article is a revision of a paper read to the Equity Round Table at the meeting 
of the Association of American Law Schools in Chicago, Dec. 28, 1939. Documentation 
has been kept to a minimum, since the Article is not intended to serve also as a reference 
source. 
1. These Acts, passed in all the states e."cept Delav.':lre, Missouri, Tc.~ and Ver-
mont, are generally of two types, those based on the California statute [Cu.. GEN. LAws 
(Deering, 1937) Act 8782] enacted in 1931, Cal. Laws 1931, c. 278 as amended in 1933, 
Cal. Laws 1933, c. 260 and as further amended in 1937, Cal. Laws 1937, c. 843 and those 
following the model statute prepared by the National Association of Retail Druggists. 
All the statutes do, however, these two things: (a) They declare that a contract which 
fi..._es a minimum (or in some cases a specific) resale price for commodities of the ldnd 
described in note 5 i1~jra, which are "in free and open competition with commodities of 
the same general" classes "produced or distributed by others" shall not be illegal because 
of its price restriction; (b) they provide that "wilfully and knowingly advertising, 
offering for sale or selling any commodity at less than the price stipulated in any 
contract entered into pursuant to the pro\isions" of the Act, "whether the person so 
advertising, offering for sale or selling is or is not a party to such a c<:mtract, is unfair 
competition and is actionable at the suit of any person damaged thereby." 
Some of the Acts e.-...-pressly provide that the resale price of a commodity cannot 
be established thereunder e."cept by "the owner of a trade-mark, brand or name used in 
connection ·with such commodity or a distributor specifically authorized to establish &lid 
price by the owner of such trade-mark, brand or name." See, e.g., N. C. CoDz Aim. 
(Michie, 1939) § 5126(n). But some of the Acts contain no such limitation and seem-
ingly permit a wholesaler, for e.~ple, to establish the resale price for commoditie5 
sold by him which bear not his trade-mark but the mark of a producer who has not 
given the wholesaler authority to establish resale prices. See Schenley Products Co. 
v. Franklin Stores Co., 124 N. J. Eq. 100, 103, 199 Atl. 402, 404 (1938) : "To assert 
that the contract [establishing the resale price] must be made by or on behalf of the 
owner of the trade-mark or brand, or by or on behalf of the producer of the commodity 
bearing the trade-mark or brand, is to import into the statute that ·which is clearly not 
within its provisions and that which is unnecessary for its operation." 
The Miller-Tydings Act, infra note 4, provides that nothing in the Sherman Act, 
26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. § 1 (1934) or the Federal Trade Commission Act, 
38 STAT. 717 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 41 (1934), shall render illegal "contracts or agree-
ments prescribing minimum prices for the resale of a commodity • • ., when contracts 
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constitutional by the Supreme Court 2 and by state courts following it,8 
that they have been shielded from conflict with the federal anti-trust laws 
by the Miller-Tydings amendment,4 and that they permit the person under 
whose trade-mark 5 goods are sold to establish, by contract with a dis-
tributor, the resale price for goods sold under that trade-mark by any 
distributor who has notice of the contract. These facts create, of course, 
important and difficult problems of practical adjustment of detail. Appar-
ently they also invite attempts which seek to generalize the effect of the 
Acts on a variety of situations other than that with which they expressly 
deal and to place them appropriately in the scheme of general legal doc-
trine. The committee in charge of the 1939 program of the Round Table 
on Equity of the Association of American Law Schools had the latter 
objects in mind when it chose for discussion the topic stated by the title 
of this Article. It suggested that the discussion be based on the back-
ground of the law of covenants or restrictions running with land. It 
believed that the fundamental questions involved were of property law, 
and that the discussion should therefore consider the nature of trade-
marks and the extent to which they can be regarded as property. And 
it desired consideration of how the important reversal of policy with 
respect to resale price maintenance affects the legal doctrine with respect 
to restrictions in general on the sale or use of chattels. 11 
or agreements of that description are lawful as applied to intrastate transaction" under 
the law of the state "in which such resale is to be made, or to which the commodity 
is to be transported for such resale . . . " 
None of the Acts applies to agreements "between or among producers or distributors 
or between or among wholesalers or between or among retailers as to sale or resale 
prices." 
The Acts are analyzed and compared in OPPENHEIM, RECENT PRICE CoNTROL LAws 
(1939). They are also summarized in Appendix A of GRETHER, PRICE CoNTROL UNDER 
FAIR TRADE LEGISLATION (1939), and are reprinted in WEIGEL, THE FAIR TRADE LAWS 
(1938). 
For interesting discussion of the history and policy of this legislation, see McLaughlin, 
Fair Trade Acts (1938) 86 U. OF PA. L. REV. 803. For reference to the literature, sec 
HANDLER, CASES ON TRADE REGULATION (1937) 1042; OPPENHEIM, CASES ON TRADE 
REGULATION (1936) 834; OPPENHEIM, RECENT PRICE CONTROL LAWS (1939) 91 62. 
2. See notes 21 and 22 infra. 
3. E.g., Bourgois Sales Corp. v. Dorfman, 273 N. Y. 167, 7 N. E. (2d) 30 (1937); 
Ely Lilly & Co. v. Saunders, 4 S. E. (2d) 528 (N. C. 1939). But see note 44 i11/ra. 
4. 50 STAT. 693 (1937), 15 U. S. C.§ 1 (Supp. 1938). 
5. The Fair Trade Acts permit resale price maintenance on a "commodity which 
bears, or the label or container of which bears, the trade mark, brand, or name of the 
producer or distributor of such commodity." See, e.g., N. Y. Laws 1935, c. 976; N. C. 
Laws 1937, c. 350, § 10. The word "trade-mark" is used in this Article in a non-technical 
sense denoting any trade symbol which suffices to qualify a commodity under the above 
provision. Sometimes the words "brand" or "trade symbol" are also used to convey 
this meaning. 
6. This is substantially and partly verbatim the exegesis which accompanied the 
proposal of the topic. 
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This advice is based on a distorted view of the Fair Trade Acts and 
aims at an impractical goal. The quest for some principle which will 
unite restrictions of the type provided by the Fair Trade Acts with 
covenants running with the land, equitable sen·itudes on land, the nature 
of trade-marks or even other restrictions affecting chattels will lead us 
either completely astray or to such abstraction as to advance us no bit 
from the point of beginning. \\That is there in the background of the 
law of covenants and restrictions affecting land? 
I 
For a great many years courts of law have been permitting some 
covenants to run with the land for the benefit or to the prejudice of third 
persons not parties to the covenants and have denied this privilege to 
other covenants. The touchstone for differentiation was and is, presum-
ably, public policy- public policy against the private imposition of unduly 
prejudicial restraints on land utilization and in favor of restrictions which 
are not so prejudicial and are desired by landowners. But the detailed 
rules for applying the test were only in part related to this policy; in part 
they were the product of habits and institutional attitudes in the convey-
ancing of land. The idea of multiplicity of interests in land was ancient 
and quite familiar. The problem was to bring these interests into some 
sort of order, to prevent the creation of too strange and unusual interests, 
to preserve the alienability of land and not to complicate further the 
already very complex task of conveying real property, that is, not to 
permit land titles to become unduly clogged. So the rules as to the form 
in which the restriction is couched, the particular e.-...-pression of intention 
to bind or benefit assigns, the privity between the parties involved, the 
e."'Cistence and nature of the dominant tenement, and the character of the 
restriction as touching or concerning the land or otherwise. Even now 
men of property are still debating the meaning, significance and suitability 
of these rules. Is any particular form of e.-...-pression of intent really neces-
sary or desirable? ·what kind of privity is required and when does it 
exist? May the dominant estate be something other than an estate in 
land and how closely ju."'Ctaposed, in space or in legal contemplation, must 
the dominant and servient tenements be? \Vhen does the restriction touch 
or concern the land and when is it collateral and hence alien? 
Again, while covenants were thus racing under rather stringent rules 
on one of the law's tracks, the same or different courts in another chamber, 
sometimes actually and sometimes only figurath·ely separate, began to 
permit the running of restrictions under a competing trade-mark, namely, 
equitable servitudes. The rules on this track are much less stringent and 
formalized. Many restrictions which can not run under the covenant 
colors are welcome under the colors of equitable ser\'itudes. But even 
here there are limitations. Not all restrictions are allowed. Here, too, 
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public policy as to land alienation and utilization is the ultimate test of 
eligibility. But here, too, that policy guides decision only more or less. 
General habits in equity administration and institutional attitudes toward 
equity, good conscience, honesty, unjust enrichment, good or bad faith 
and the conveyancing of land are factors contributing to actual decisions. 
Men of equity have debated the nature and principles of equitable servi-
tudes with enthusiasm and varying degrees of brilliance. Is the equitable 
servitude a right in rem or a right in personam?1 Is its enforcement for 
and against third persons an incident of specific performance of contracts 
or is it based on a different theory, so as to be permissible when specific 
performance is either unavailable or not contemplated? \Vhen is a finding 
of notice justified and how far is it proper to bind persons with the tics 
of notice when actual knowledge is lacking but possible or impossible 
investigation would have created at least suspicion? Should differentia-
tion be made between negative and affirmative servitudes, and if so, what 
are the proper criteria for differentiation? If a suitable negative injunc-
tion can be framed may it be used to enforce a seemingly affirmative 
servitude? Indeed, it has been urged that we should stop thinking of 
these restrictions as equitable servitudes and regard them rather as ease-
ments or quasi-easements enforceable by whatever remedy in the law's 
cabinet is appropriate under the circumstances, by injunction perhaps 
usually, by damages when harm is recognized but the injunction would 
be too severe.8 Have we, it is asked, been so captured by the trade-mark 
as to overlook the quality and function of the product? 
The point is, however, that if satisfactory answers are made to all the 
questions about real covenants and equitable servitudes on land, what is 
their significance in a consideration of restrictions in the commerce in 
goods? For the answer it is appropriate to refer first to impeccable 
authority. 
In 1928, Professor Chafee wrote a tremendous and monumental article 
entitled Equitable Servitudes on Chattels.0 Whatever job was to be done 
in that direction he did. He began with the statement of fact that: "Just 
as sellers of land desired to limit its use by remote owners, sellers of 
chattels and other kinds of personal property wished to impose restric-
tions on these while in the hands of subsequent purchasers." 10 Then he 
proceeded to inquire whether there was any power in a "doctrine of equit-
able servitudes on chattels" to afford realization of that business desire. 
His introductory resume of the cases dealing with resale price mainten-
7. See Chafee, Equitable Servitudes 01~ Chattels (1928) 41 HARV. L. REV, 945,91;7, 
n.30. 
8. See CLARK, CoVENANTS AND INTERESTS RUNNING WITH LAND (1929) 153 et 
passim. 
9. (1928) 41 HARV. L. REV. 945. 
10. Id. at 946. 
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ance, territorial restrictions and tying clauses suggested "that the doctrine 
of equitable servitudes on chattels [had] been effectually killed by the 
courts." 11 But he was not discouraged; because "the issue of the e.xten-
sion" to chattels of the principle of Tulk r• .... lf o:rlzay/2 the fountain head 
of equitable servitudes on land, had "not been squarely treated in the 
cases." Rather, the decisions were largely based on issues of "restraint 
of trade" and the scope of the patent or copyright monopoly.13 Conse-
quently he proceeded with his inquiry and looked everywhere, with tele-
scope and microscope. He considered the "general equitable principles," 
"analogous equitable interests in personalty," ''the analogy of Lumley 
v. Gye"14 and the possible "reasons against the e.xistence of equitable 
servitudes on chattels" which would apply to all chattels as distinguished 
from land and to all restrictions thereon as distinguished from particular 
restrictions. After forty-one pages of skillful distillation of the essence 
from a mass of apparently unrelated tl1eories, principles and cases, he 
concluded-how?-"tl1e doctrine of equitable servitudes [on chattels] 
is a legitimate tool in the judicial equipment, ready for usc 'Zi!lum dcsir-
able."15 He did not mean, of course, that the enforcement of restrictions 
on chattels is required by the general principles which he discussed or 
by doctrines as to equitable servitudes on land, or covenants running 
with the land or inducement of breach of contract. He meant merely 
that if tlzeir enforceme1tt is deemed desirable, appropriate and more or 
less familiar means for accomplishing that end can be developed in the 
law, just as they were developed with reference to restrictions on land 
or unfair competition. Now that is of course important, -even though 
the nature of the proof might be mistaken to assume that equity courts 
have an· e.xclusive monopoly in the field and that equitable sen•itudes on 
chattels would be unthinkable if we did not have equitable servitudes on 
land. It should serve to remind courts that tl1e development of law (law 
in its entirety, including equity ratl1er than as distinguished from it) has 
not stopped. It should apprise them that it is not a sufficient reason 
for the denial of enforcement to a restriction affecting personal property 
that the restriction does not fall within the detailed rules for the enforce-
ment of restrictions on land. But granting that a '\·indication of the 
obvious" is sometimes as important as an investigation of the uncertain, 
it certainly is not necessary, after Professor Chafee's effort, to seek 
again to establish that restrictions may legally be imposed on the sale or 
11. !d. at 955. 
12. 2 Ph. 774, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (Ch. 1848). 
13. Chafee, Equitable Servitudes on Chattels (1928) 41 IL\R\'. L R£\•. 945, 956-957. 
14. 2 Ell. & BL 216, 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (Q. B. 1853) (liability for inducing breach 
of contract by peaceful persuasion). 
15. Chafee, Equitable Servitudes 01~ Chattels (1928) 41 Ht.nv. L REv. 945, 937. 
Italics supplied. 
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use of chattels by third persons if the enforcement of such restrictions 
is deemed desirable.16 
Whether their enforcement is desirable is a wholly different question 
from that as to the enforceability of servitudes on land. The latter deal 
with the use of land by its occupants; the restriction is imposed on a 
specific parcel of land and limits its use. The former deal with commerce, 
the marketing of goods ; the restriction imposed in a sale of one parcel 
affects all other parcels marketed under the same trade symbol. Simplicity 
of titles, freedom of alienation, availability for proper use, and zoning 
of neighborhoods, the important aims of policy in the case of land, are 
seldom involved in the case of goods. What are involved are the public 
advantages sought to be derived from the maintenance of effective com-
petition and avoidance of monopolistic control- a policy which, con-
versely, is rarely affected by equitable servitudes on land. There is, of 
course, the formal similarity stated by Professor Chafee, that sellers 
of chattels wish t~ impose restrictions on them while in the hands of 
subsequent purchasers just as sellers of land desire to limit its use by 
remote owners.17 But surely there is greater significance in the differences 
between the reasons for these desires and between the likely consequences 
of their realization. This was apparently Professor Chafee's experience. 
Having devoted forty-one pages to a demonstration on legalistic grounds 
"that the do_ctrine of equitable servitudes [on chattels] is a legitimate 
tool in the judicial equipment, ready for use when desirable," he gave 
only twenty-six pages to his stimulating discussion of specific types of 
restrictions on goods and the social and economic policies relevant to 
their enforceability. But the smaller concrete discussion seems to have 
been the more effective. For in the end he concluded: "At the close of 
my inquiry it must be admitted that I am much less convinced of the 
desirability of equitable servitudes on chattels than when I began." 18 
Likewise, assuming enforceability of both types of restrictions, the 
detailed rules of administration evolved in the land cases have little utility 
in the goods cases. They cannot be transferred bodily, because they are 
couched in language which has no meaning with reference to chattels. 
16. It is still urged by some that there is a general principle coming from the days 
of Lord Coke and applicable to the sale of all property, whether real or personal, that 
a seller may not on the one hand sell and on the other withhold from the purchaser 
some of the normal incidents of ownership. The principle is asserted, apparently, as a 
matter of impossibility in nature and logic, although it is conceded that a legislature 
may do the impossible. Easements are said not to be exceptions to the rule because 
they constitute interests in land. Equitable servitudes, it is urged, are really easements 
and thus explain themselves as not being exceptions. Therefore, the universal rule is 
still, as paraphrased by a colleague, a sale is a sale is a sale is a sale . • • My remarks 
are addressed, of course, to human, not divine, law. 
17. See note 10 supra. 
18. Chafee, Eqttitable Servitudes 011 Chattels (1928) 41 HARV, L. REv. 945, 1013. 
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Nor can they generally afford valuable analogy. Since they deal with 
different physical situations, implement different policies and arc con-
ditioned by different institutions, their use as analogies requires transla-
tion into more abstract form and produces unending argument as to the 
propriety of the translation and the significance of conceded similarities 
and differences in the problems. The e.xciting debate may then entice 
attention away from the needs of the case in hand. 
The nature of trade-marks may indeed seem more relevant, since the 
Fair Trade Acts deal only with branded goods. I, too, have been a par-
ticipant in the debate as to whether the basis of relief against trade-mark 
infringement is the e.xclusive ownership of the trade-mark as an object 
of property or rather the protection against tortious interference with 
trade expectancies by confusion of purchasers; and I have enthusiastically 
argued the Hand-Holmes view that the latter is the "true basis."10 How-
ever, I think it will soon become apparent that the "nature" of trade-
marks and the "true basis" of their protection has practically nothing 
to do with the problems of the Fair Trade Acts. 
II 
Speaking broadly and so to some e.xtent inaccurately, the Fair Trade 
Acts legitimatize resale price maintenance on trade-marked, or other-
wise branded goods. Now resale price maintenance is neither a new 
phrase nor a new idea. It behooves lawyers, therefore, as perhaps the 
original legitimate semanticists, to look carefully to the meaning of the 
symbol in its conte.xt, not merely its language conte.xt but its conte.'\."t in 
the life of which it is part. Resale price maintenance under the Fair 
Trade Acts is not the resale price maintenance condemned in the Dr. 
Jliles Medical Company case.20 And even resale price maintenance under 
the Fair Trade Acts may have different functions. 
One strong impulse to the enactment of these statutes was the Supreme 
Court's decisions in the Scagram 21 and Pep Boj•s22 cases, holding the 
Illinois and California Acts not vulnerable to the constitutional attack 
there made. The Supreme Court thought it was dealing with the resale 
price maintenance that was more than SO years old, the resale price main-
tenance which was the subject of conflicting common law decisions and 
which was described in Professor Chafee's article; that is, a device of 
19. See Beech-Nut Packing Co. v. Lorillard Co., 273 U. S. 629 (1927) ; Bayer Co. 
Y. United Drug Co., 272 Fed. 505 (S. D. N. Y. 1921} ; DEnENDEl:!G, TMDZ-MM.x>: Pno-
TECTION AND UNFAIR TRADING (1936) 47 et seq.; 3 REsTATE'..mNT, To:rrs (1933) § 715, 
comment b. 
20. Dr. :Miles :Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U. S. 373 (1911). 
21. Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U. S. 183 (1936). 
22. The Pep Boys, Manny, Moe & Jack of Cal., Inc. v. P)Tuil Sales Co., Inc., 
299 u. s. 198 (1936). 
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which "the primary aim . . . was to protect the property- namely, the 
good will-of the producer" of the trade-marked goods.23 Consequently, 
the rule permitting such standardization of prices "was based upon the 
distinction found to exist between articles of trade put out by the manu-
facturer or producer under, and identified by, patent, copyright, trade-
mark, brand, or similar device, and articles of like character put out by 
others and not so identified." 24 In the case of the former, that is, the 
branded product, the "good will created or enlarged by the identifying 
mark or brand" is necessarily involved in the sales all along the line of 
marketing to the ultimate consumer. 25 If prospective purchasers find 
that product on sale at different prices in different stores, particularly 
if they find it frequently sold at low "reduced" prices in one store while 
it is selling at higher "regular" prices in other stores, their faith in the 
value of the product will be destroyed and the loss of prestige of the 
product will soon be reflected in loss of sales by the producer. Similar 
loss is expected also from the unorganized hostility to the product thereby 
engendered among retailers. Merchants will not carry or will not push 
such products when they must sell them either at higher prices than their 
price-cutting competitors or at similarly reduced prices which yield little 
or no profit. 
In this view of the Fair Trade Acts, then. the principal bNc Jtoire is 
the "loss leader" practice, that is, the sale of well-known branded goods 
below their equally well-known regular prices, with resulting loss thereon 
to the seller, in order to advertise the seller and increase his volume of 
sales of other goods to his greater over-all profit. The person seeking 
protection against its depredations is the producer or other person identi-
fied by the trade symbol under which the goods are sold and which is 
the catalytic agent in creating, enlarging or holding the goodwill of the 
product, and hence of the producer, in the market. The weapon of defense 
is a contract between the producer or other trade-mark owner and the 
purchaser from him whereby the purchaser undertakes not to resell the 
goods at a price lower than that stipulated in the contract and not to 
resell to a merchant without exacting a similar contract from him. 
Strangers to the contract are not bound by it, except to the extent that 
they are subject to liability under general tort law for inducing or par-
ticipating in a breach by a contracting party. Whatever restraint of 
competition is thus affected "is strictly limited to that portion of the 
entire product put out and plainly identified by a particular manufacturer 
or producer," "leaving competition between articles so identified by a 
given manufacturer and all other articles of like kind to have full play." 20 
23. Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U. S. 183, 193 
(1936). 
24. Id. at 188. 
25. Id. at 194-195. 
26. !d. at 190. 
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"These statutes," wrote Mr. EdwardS. Rogers, "are based upon gtJod-
will as a property right and recognize its value.":-:!7 "The first thing to 
consider in thinking of [them] is that there is nothing compulsory or 
regulatory about them. Their operation is limited to trade-mark~d goods 
which are in competition with other goods of the same class [using 
the word trade-mark in a colloquial sense] ... In an effort to put a 
curse on them, these acts are sometimes called price-fixing statutes, but 
they are not. They do not fi.x prices or require that prices be fixed. They 
do not regulate anything or anybody. They are permissive only. They 
allow a single producer, if he chooses to do so. to make contracts with 
distributors of goods identified as coming from him (if they wish to 
enter into such a contract with him) establishing the prices to [sic] 
which the producer's identified merchandise shall be rcsold.":2s 
Now I have no purpose to put a curse on the Fair Trade Acts. Like 
Mr. Rogers, "I am neither an economist nor a prophet. \Vhat the effect 
of these statutes is going to be in the long run, I do not know.":::~ .\gain, 
the name attached to these Acts should hardly be of controlling impor-
tance. They are not bad merely because they are price-fixing statutes or 
good merely because they are not. But it is important that we keep 
straight in our thinking and look behind the face or name to recognize 
the real matters involved. The view of the Fair Trade Acts which the 
courts found not constitutionally ugly30 and which Mr. Rogers describes 
is one view, the view seen not so much by the eye looking out now and 
here, but by the brain reminiscing about resale price maintenance when 
it was young, fresh and fair. But there is another view which shows 
resale price maintenance in its present background. It may still be fair; 
but the picture is entirely different. 
In this view. the Fair Trade Acts are concerned not with the protection 
of the producer or the owner of the trade-mark, but with the protection 
of certain types of wholesale and retail distributors. Their function and 
object is not to protect the goodwill symbolized by the trade-marl•. but 
to alleviate the rigors of price competition between distributors. The 
device of voluntary contract is a transparent mask borrowed from history 
to conceal the substance of prohibition of price competition in the distri-
bution of trade-marked goods. And the concern of the Acts with trade-
marked goods is accidental and incidental and similar regulation with 
27. Foreword in \VEIGEL, THE FAIR TRADE ACTS (1938) iv. Mr. Rogers argued the 
Pep Bo'J•S case, supra note 22, on behalf of the trade-mark owner. 
28. I d. at iii. 
29. !d. at v. For careful forecast partly on the basis of C.'\."PCricncc and partly on the 
basis of economic theorizing and analysis, see GRETHER, Prue& Cm:n:oL U:rom FAin 
TRADE LEGISLATION (1939). 
30. Other courts have followed the Supreme Court's lead and have stressed the 
producer's good will. See, e.g., Ely Lilly & Co. v. Saunders, 4 S. E. (2d) 523 (N. C. 
1939). 
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respect to non-trade marked goods is sought to be achieved through other 
means by the same interests which are behind the Fair Trade Acts. All 
this seems quite obvious. Yet, I, too, feel impelled at this point to vindi-
cate the obvious. · 
It is common knowledge that the pressure for the passage of these 
Acts, insofar as it was publicly disclosed, came not from manufacturers 
or other trade-mark owners but from distributors- first and foremost 
the retail druggists associations and then other retail and wholesale dis-
tributors.31 It is doubtless true that many distributors wanted resale 
price maintenance at the time of the Dr. Miles case.32 And doubtless 
true also that some manufacturers want resale price maintenance now 
for the reasons stated by the Supreme Court, Professor Chafee and Mr. 
Rogers. But the organized pressure for the Fair Trade Acts, however 
subsidized privately, came from distributor groups; and the legislative 
response was response to distributor groups. Distributors organized in 
Code Authorities under the NRA sought to deal with the problems of 
loss leaders, price cutting and so-called predatory or cut-throat price 
competition.33 Upon the demise of the NRA, they turned to the Fair 
Trade Acts as a partial substitute. The concern of the distributors was 
not for the goodwill symbolized by the trade-mark, but for their own 
welfare. They sought an adequate mark-up, and adequate profit on the 
goods which they marketed,- not protection of the manufacturer's trade 
expectancies. They sought to protect themselves against old and new 
methods of merchandising which threatened their positions whether or 
not the producer or his goodwill were similarly threatened. If the pro-
ducer were also to profit from the scheme, that was an accidental incident. 
This concern of the distributors is not limited, of course, to trade-
marked goods. It extends to all goods which they handle. Under the 
NRA, they sought to deal with the problem in respect of all goods. 
After the NRA, they continued the effort. But there was the problem 
of appropriate means. How control price competition so as to eliminate 
cut-throat competition, the "competition that kills?" New devices might 
be sought. But there was an old device at hand- resale price main-
tenance. True that was intended originally for the protection of the 
producer's goodwill. But all the better. It can achieve the standardization 
of resale prices for branded goods at least- which would accomplish 
part of the total desired result. And it can incidentally enlist the support 
for this purpose of an irrelevant and even misleading, though nevertheless 
powerful and effective, theory. 
That left the problem in respect to goods not identified by trade symbol. 
This couldn't be solved by the same device of resale price maintenance, 
31. See GRETHER, op. cit. supra note 29, at 83 et passim. 
32. See note 20 supra. 
33. See MACK, CoNTROLLING RETAILERS (1936) 188, 261. 
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not because the interests or desires were different, but merely because 
practical and historical differences in the make-up and marketing of the 
goods made that device administratively unavailable. Consequently resort 
was had to what are called .Anti-Discrimination Statutes3 t and Unfair 
Practices Acts.35 These could not effect price standardization in the same 
way as the Fair Trade Acts. But, by prohibiting unjustifiable discrimina-
tion and sales below cost, and prescribing how cost is to be computed, 
they were intended to hit at substantially the san1e e,·il and alleviate the 
hardships of "cut-throat" competition. Other devices have been enacted 
for particular types of products and the search for more effective con-
trols is still on.36 
E:x.-perience under the Fair Trade Acts emphasizes their function to 
protect distributors against what is deemed undesirable price competition. 
Some producers have indeed availed themseh·es voluntarily of the power 
granted by the Acts; but many have been unwilling or reluctant to do 
so.37 Organizations of distributors have been very active in efforts to 
bring the recalcitrant producers into the fold. They have predicted or 
threatened distributor boycotts of products not brought under the Acts 
by their producers.38 Some wholesalers have even endeavored themselves 
to fix retail prices for branded goods sold by them when the producers 
have failed to do so.39 A rather peculiar effort to protect the producers' 
goodwill! And organizations of distributors have been most active in 
efforts to enforce the Acts. 
34. See OPPENHEIM, RECENT PRICE Co:NTROL LAWS (1939) 105, for a summary ::md 
comparison of the provisions of the various state statutes. ~{:my statutes of this kind are 
aimed at monopolization and have been on the books for some time; some were 113SSCd 
after the NRA. e.g., the Robinson-Patman Act [49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U. S. C.§ 13 
(Supp. 1938)] and the state acts following it as well as those following the California 
model, CAL. GEN. LAws (Deering, 1937) Act 8781. 
35. Prohibiting sales below cost. See OPPENHEIM, REcENT PRICE Co:~mOL LAws 
(1939) 63. 
36. Recent Connecticut legislation prohibits retailers of gasoline from posting thcir 
prices at their stations on signs e.xceeding 126 square inches. CoNN. GE:.-;. STAT. § 554e 
, (Supp. 1939) .. Prior to the 1939 Act, the statutes required retailers to post thcir prices 
in figures at least five inches high and four inches wide. Co1m. GE!:. STAT. § 649.:: (Supp. 
1935).. The 1939 legislation reduces the minimum size of the figures to hvo :md a half 
inches in height and a proportional width and adds the abo\·e ma.ximum limit. 
3i. This is commonly rumored in the liquor trade. One argument used for re~e 
price maintenance in liquor is that it reduces sales stimulation and, consequently, liquor 
consumption. This may e.'\.-plain the reluctance of some distillers and points to still 
another function of the Fair Trade Acts. 
38. See GRETHER, op. cit . .supra note 29, at 92 et .seq. 
39. Schenley Products Co. v. Franklin Stores Co., 124 N. J. Eq. 100, 199 Atl. 402 
(1938). See note !.supra and also the omnibus contract once recommended by the Nationru 
Wholesale Druggists Association reprinted in ZoRN AND FELDMAN, BusmESs Umn::n 
THE NEW PRICE LAWS (1937) 437. 
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· The problem of enforcement is complicated by the fact that the resale 
prices fixed under the Acts are binding not only on those who agree to 
maintain them but also on those who do not agree but who have knowledge 
of them. This presents another veil to be pierced if one is to sec the 
reality. 
The old resale price maintenance rested entirely on contract and the 
producer's power to refuse to sell to those who would not comply. 40 The 
Fair Trade Acts pretend to be also based on contract. So the Supreme 
Court and Mr. Rogers point out that the Acts merely permit the parties 
to a sale to make a voluntary agreement as to resale prices, if they so 
desire. But isn't that completely fanciful? A single contract between 
the manufacturer and a single retailer, if brought to the attention of the 
entire trade, is sufficient to bind the entire trade !41 Even technically 
the "contract" is rather strange.42 The manufacturer and retailer, between 
whom there may be no other direct dealing, sign a document in which 
the retailer makes the promises. He agrees to sell the named products 
on the stated price terms. The manufacturer reserves the right to change 
those terms merely by notice to the retailer. And he reserves the right 
in the same manner to add other goods to the contract. In the longer 
form of contract, effort is made to comply more fully with the legal 
requirement of consideration for the promises by the retailer. They are 
said to be in consideration of similar contracts between the producer and 
other retailers, although that may seem supererogatory since other retailers 
are bound by notice even in absence of contract. The producer also agrees 
to make best efforts to fill or have filled the retailer's orders at the pro~ 
ducer's current prices so long as the retailer maintains proper credit 
standing. This is doubtless valuable because, otherwise, perchance the 
producer would not be anxious to sell his products. And provision is 
made for cancellation of the contract by either party. But the retailer 
40. See McLaughlin, supra note 1. 
41. Houbrigant Sales Corp. v. Woods Drug Store, 123 N. J. Eq. 40, 196 Atl. 686 
(1939). The Supreme Court did not consider this to be an unconstitutional invasion 
of the liberty of non-agreeing traders to fix their own prices. "Appellants here acquired 
the commodity in question with full knowledge of the then-existing restriction in respect 
of price . . . and, of course, with presumptive if not actual knowledge of the law which 
authorized the restriction. Appellants were not obliged to buy; and their voluntary 
acquisition of the property with such knowledge carried with it, upon every principle 
of fair dealing, assent to the protective restriction, with consequent liability under § 2 
of the law by which such acquisition was conditioned." Old Dearborn Distributing Co. 
v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U. S. 183, 193 (1936). This much can, of course, 
equally be said about any compulsory prices legislatively fixed. 
The Wisconsin statute provides for a governmental review of the fairness of the 
prices established. See Weco Products Co. v. Reed Drug Co., 225 Wis. 474, 274 N. W. 
426 (1937). 
42. For forms of contracts, see Prentice-Hall 1935 Trade and Ind. Serv. UU 95,151-
95,153; WEIGEL, THE FAIR TRADE ACTS (1938) 219. 
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states his understanding that cancellation does not give him freedom to 
sell the goods on price terms other than those stipulated. ,.V oticc of the 
fixed price, not contract, is then the heart of the Fair Trade Acts. \Vhen 
the historical vestiges and the legalistic frills are pressed aside, the Acts 
provide for fixing resale prices by notice to prospective sellers. This may 
be significant in a consideration of the Miller-Tydings amendment to 
the Sherman Act, providing that nothing therein "shall render illegal, 
contracts or agreements prescribing minimum prices for the resale of a 
commodity . . . , when contracts or agreements of that description are 
lawful as applied to intrastate transactions" under state law."'3 
\Vhat happens, then, when we see the Fair Trade Acts not as the 
Supreme Court saw them but as they appeared to the legislatures and 
the trade? By merely knocking the props of theory from under the Court's 
decision do we topple the structure of constitutionality built on those 
props?44 Probably not. \Ve are impelled, however, to face the real 
foundations and consider their sufficiency.4G 
If the Acts, in design and operation, be deemed to protect and advance 
a selfish pressure group at the e.xpense of the public interest, the struc-
ture may indeed topple despite the respect for legislative determinations. 
But retailers and wholesalers constitute a large enough class of the popu-
lation to warrant consideration of their welfare as part of the public 
interest. Few would object to legislation designed to relieve them of the 
alleged evil of "loss leaders," if only the practice could be properly identi-
fied and appropriate means for its confinement devised. But the Fair 
Trade Acts attempt much more. They permit elimination of price com-
petition in the distribution of goods, even when differences in price reflect 
only differences in efficiency. They permit competition between producers, 
43. See note 4 supra. Italics supplied. 
-14. A South Dakota court declared a Fair Trade Act violative of the South Dalwb. 
constitution providing that "No incorporated company, co-partnership, or as£ociation of 
persons in this state . . • shall directly or indirectly combine or make any contract in 
any manner whatever to fix prices • . . so as to prevent competition in such prices • • • " 
Dargen v. Townsend, Prentice-Hall, Trade and Ind. Sen•. 1!97,016 (S. D. Zd Jud. Circ. 
1939). See the constitutional provisions cited in OPPENHEIM, REC£!IT Prua: Comr:liL 
LAws (1939) 31-32, n. 67. 
45. If the Supreme Court's theory is accepted, it is important to point out that r~e 
price maintenance may be used not only to protect an e.-dstins sood will, but also to 
create a good will, that price maintenance, like a trade-mark, may begin simultaneously 
with a business. The device of standardized prices, like that of an attractive trade-marl: 
or slogan, may be adopted with the hope that it ·will create good will and for that very 
purpose. The good will may be based on the merit of the product or merely on the 
stupidity, vanity, or deception of consumers and may be the result of the legal protection 
rather than the thing protected. Again, a comprehensive discussion of rc..oale price 
maintenance should include consideration of its relation to larse-scale, national ad\·cr-
tising and of the economic effects of the latter and of trade-mark differentiation generally. 
See CHASE AND ScHLINK, YoUR :MoNEY's \VORTH (1927) ; CHAMD<:nLm, Tm: Tnr:li:t¥ 
oF MoNOPOLISTIC Co:m>ETITION (1935) Appendix E. 
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between commodities, but restrain competition between distributors, be~ 
tween different methods of distribution. They permit the fixing of prices 
in what may be the worst way,- not by a public body, not in accordance 
with even vague, prescribed standards, not for named commodities or 
classes of goods, but by the unilateral action of any private trade-mark 
owner for any goods marketed under his trade-mark. Is that bad? J udg~ 
ment would, of course, be relatively easy if knowledge of the facts and 
the consequences were present. But the facts are still in dispute and 
the consequences speculative. 
We do know that the Acts can be applied to only a limited fraction 
of all goods, probably a relatively small fraction, but that fraction in 
which competition is already limited by brand differentiation. We know 
that there are strong forces to counteract the effects of the Acts: the 
competition of unbranded and private brand goods, the hostility of certain 
types of distributors, the reluctance of some producers to adopt the plan 
and the difficulties of enforcement. There is evidence that while the Acts 
result in increase of prices to some consumers, those who hunt for bar~ 
gains and who buy at establishments operating at minimum cost and with 
minimum service and display, they also result in reduction of prices to 
other consumers, those who do not shop around and, to whom, perhaps, 
price is not so important. There is evidence also that while the Acts 
have increased the margins of some distributors they have decreased the 
margins of others and have not completely fulfilled the expectations of 
their supporters. The relative strength of these tendencies and their net 
effects are. however, still unknown. 46 
Again, we know and can sympathize with the plight of some interests 
sponsoring the Acts. The corner tobacconist or druggist who sees his 
income dwindling because, as he thinks, the large department store or 
chain grocery sells tobacco products at reduced prices merely as a service 
or attraction for customers without any effort to realize a profit from 
this business. Even if he recognizes that he must take the risks of 
superior efficiency, he is sure that it is unfair for his competitor not to 
allocate to the competing business its proper share of the cost of doing 
business and thus receive aid from non-competing lines. Similarly, the 
small distributor who is ready enough to concede defeat by superior 
efficiency is understandably enraged when he is defeated by discriminatory 
prices and other advantages granted to his competitor merely because 
of the competitor's superior financial and bargaining power. And, in 
any event, such distributors have the human desire not to be killed so 
soon. If modern changes in marketing spell their doom in this business, 
they wish the sentence to be executed mercifully; they desire postpone-
ment or time for adjustment and for alleviation of the shock of transi-
46. See GRETHER, op. cit. supra note 29. 
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tion. They feel that they should not be required to pay, alone and at 
once, the cost of general economic betterment. Perhaps this is mere 
euphemism for plain selfishness. But it evokes sympathy for such 
measures as the anti-discrimination laws, the statutes prohibiting sales 
below cost, the chain store ta.xes,- and the Fair Trade Acts, even though 
they seem rather inappropriate for the purpose invoh·ed. 
The legislative enactment of these Acts relieves the courts of a very 
hard choice of fundamental policy and imposes on them the difficult task 
of detailed administration and the responsibility of scrutinizing the 
schemes in particular circumstances to see that they are not used to 
achieve the illegal aim of restricting competition between producers. 
These are no light jobs. Consider for a moment some of the problems. 
The Acts are applicable by their terms only to branded goods which 
are "in free and open competition with commodities of the same general 
class produced or distributed by others." 47 Now a trade-mark, by the 
very fact that it seeks to differentiate commodities and attribute unique-
ness to them, necessarily limits the competition between them to some 
extent. Surely the Acts cannot be construed to e.xclude such limitation. 
But general classes of commodities are not ordained; and there are vary-
ing degrees of competition. One brand of tooth paste may compete with 
other brands, but not in the way in which one book competes with 
another.48 Is Law and Politics_,49 the collection of the writings of :\Ir. 
Justice Frankfurter, in free and open competition with other books? Do 
people buy reading matter or specific writings? Is the "free and open 
competition" requirement satisfied by the e.xistence of some competition 
even when, for example, a product is patented or one producer has domi-
nant control? 
Again, the Acts renounce any purpose to legitimatize so-called "hori-
zontal" agreements, concerted action by producers or by distributors. 
Mr. Justice Sutherland pointed out in the Seagram case that the Acts 
permit restraint of competition only in the distribution of the branded 
product leaving free and open the competition between products, whether 
branded or otherwise.li0 Nevertheless, the Acts may he useful precisely 
in the latter connection, when the small number of producers involved 
or other circumstances facilitate concert of action. Price competition in 
the retailing of gasoline. for e.xample, is quite different from that in 
patent medicines. The retail price of standard gasoline in any community 
47. See note 1 supra. 
48. And consumer loyalty to a brand of tooth-paste may be quite different from that 
to a brand of perfume. This affects the ad\isability of a manufacturer's adoption of re~te 
price maintenance when competitors do not adopt it and the price which can be cstal:l-
lished. 
49. FRANKFURTER, LAw AND PoLITics (1939). 
50. See note 26 supra. 
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is the same for all brands, or at least for all major brands. A drop in 
the price of one is almost immediately followed by an equal drop in the 
prices of the others. The reduction is usually absorbed not by the retailer 
but by the "producer," the company under whose tr~de-mark the gasoline 
is marketed. Stabilization of retail prices of gasoline may thus mean 
restriction of price competition between its producers rather than its 
retailers; and that was well recognized in the days of the Petroleum 
Code. In gasoline, because of more or less peculiar marketing character-
istics, the talk about protection of prestige and goodwill symbolized by 
trade-mark is particularly false and misleading. Are the courts to take 
such variations into account in administering the Acts? Further, is con-
certed action by distributors to coerce a reluctant manufacturer to "protect 
his goodwill" by resort to the Acts a violation of the anti-trust acts ?G1 
Is there such a violation when manufacturers agree to avail themselves 
of the Acts without, however, agreeing on the prices to be fixed? And 
are the restrictions on price thus procured enforceable? 
There are other issues no less difficult. What defenses are available 
to a distributor who knowingly sells below the fixed price? A price 
war is started by a retailer who claims to avail himself of the privilege 
granted by the Acts to reduce his prices in a closing-out sale. May his • 
competitors meet his prices? May an alleged violator defend on the 
ground that the market is demoralized and price cutting rampant? Or that 
the producer is not diligent or successful in prosecuting or ending viola-
tions, or discriminates in the institution of prosecutions or in his prices 
to retailers ?52 And what is to be the effect of the Acts on established 
practices entirely unrelated to the evils of price-cutting against which 
they are directed? For example, employers commonly give discounts on 
purchases from them by their employees. A New Jersey court has held, 
to my mind indefensibly, that this practice may not be continued with 
respect to goods price-fixed under a Fair Trade Act.li3 Similar questions 
are raised in respect to cooperatives 54 and the giving of trading stamps.liG 
Again, there is an established business in repacking or rebottling trade-
marked goods into small packages and selling them to consumers who 
cannot, or for other reasons do not, buy in the larger quantities. Several 
51. The answer to this question may well depend upon what is regarded as a proper 
purpose of the legislation, protection of distributors or of producers' good will. A similar 
question may be raised with respect to concerted action by distributors to police the 
system. 
52. See the cases collected in 0PPENHEillr, RECENT PRICE CONTROL LAWS (1939) 
60-62. 
53. Bristol-Myers Co. v. L. Bamberger & Co., 122 N. ]. Eq. 559, 195 Atl. 625 
(1937), 124 N. ]. Eq. 235, 1 A. (2d) 332 (1938). 
54. Weco Products Co. v. R-eed Drug Co., 225 Wis. 474, 274 N. W. 426 (1937). 
55. Bristol-Myers Co. v. Lit Bros., Inc., 6 A. (Zd) 843 (Pa. 1939). 
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recent cases involved this situation.rm Plaintiff is the producer of perfwne 
which it markets under the trade-mark, say "Charvard." It fi.xes a retail 
price for this product of $1.60 for one dram or less. Actually it does 
not market the product in smaller quantities. Nips, Inc., buys this genuine 
perfume, rebottles it into small ampules containing about one drop each 
and supplies them to five and ten cent stores where each ampule is sold 
for ten cents, with the complete disclosure that the perfume is Charvard's 
rebottled by Nips which is wholly independent of Chan·ard.::.r A dram 
selling at $1.60 is enough to fill some 70 an1pules which return a total 
of $7.00. Injunctions have been issued against the sale of the ampules 
at less than $1.60. Yet the objection here is not to price cutting and the 
loss of goodwill that it might entail, but rather to the market in which the 
perfume was sold, to the diminution in quantity which made the perfwne 
available at a relatively high price to a class of purchasers for whom the 
product would otherwise be out of reach. To be sure, the plaintiff's good-
will may be prejudiced by both practices. But does the protection of the 
Fair Trade Acts extend beyond prejudice from a particular type of 
practice? Such are the problems of detail in the administration of these 
Acts. 
III 
The change of policy with reference to resale price maintenance was 
not due to the pressure of analogies from the law of real property or to 
the discovery or better understanding of any doctrine of equitable servi-
tudes or of any general principles of equity jurisprudence, fundamental 
or otherwise. It was rather the response to a cry of distress from groups 
of people who have found their voices and who have learned, particularly 
during the days of the NRA, how to use them in unison and effectively. 
\Vhatever ''law of restrictive agreements affecting chattels" there is, then, 
outside of resale price maintenance, is entirely unaffected by the Fair 
Trade Acts. For even a four-word generic name cannot create unity for 
the variety of arrangements that might be denominated by it. Each such 
arrangement, or at least each type, must be im·estigated separately and 
its validity judged by its own functions and consequences. 
Once certain phonograph records carried a notice that they were to 
be used only with named phonographs or only with sound reproducing 
machines.:;s These restrictions are certainly different in their functions 
and criteria of validity from a barely conceivable one declaring tl1at the 
56. They are discussed in (1939) 49 YALE L. ]. 145. 
57. This practice does not constitute trade-mark infringement. Prestoncttcs, Inc. v. 
Coty, 264 U. S. 359 (1924) ; 3 REsTATE:!.fENT, ToRTS (1938) §§ 736, 737; or passing off: 
3 REsTATEMENT, ToRTS (1938) § 714. 
58. See Leeds & Catlin Co. v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 213 U. S. 325 (1909) ; 
_Fonotipia, Ltd. v. Bradley, 171 Fed. 951 (C. C. N. Y. 1909). 
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records are not to be eaten with goldfish by college sopHomores. And 
they differ no less clearly from the notices now found on records that 
they are not to be used for broadcasting by radio Go- restrictions that 
raise novel conflicts of interests between the performing artist, the re-
corder, the composer, the publisher, the broadcaster and the advertiser 00 
which cannot be referred for solution even to the vague standards of 
public interest in the maintenance of effective competition or the alien-
ability of property. 
Still different from these restrictions is the negative pledge clause 
in the indentures involved in Kelly v. Central Hanover Bank,01 providing 
that the debtor would not pledge any of its property without assuring 
to the indenture holders equal participation in the security. The issue in 
the case was whether the debenture holders could at least share in the 
pledge equally with the pledgee who, it was alleged, took the pledge as 
security for a loan with notice of the restriction but without compliance 
with it. Immediately, the issue related not to the regulation of future 
business conduct but to the distribution of losses from a past transaction 
more or less in accordance with the legitimate expectations of the parties. 
In its implications as to the future, the issue required determination of 
the effectiveness with which this security device was to be endowed. There 
was no objection in policy to the debtor's giving his creditors the most 
assured type of security. The objection to the particular device used, 
passing all questions of interpretation, was that it provided such inef-
fective security. The debtor retained such comprehensive control that 
the creditor was at best left with very little protection. There might 
have been the question first, then, whether it was worth while continuing 
a device which was so misleading to investors, which might appear to 
them to secure much when in fact it gave little beyond the word of the 
debtor. The device at best would work only against subsequent pledgees 
with notice; it would not work against purchasers at all and against 
pledgees without notice. What would constitute notice would depend upon 
the uncertainties of litigation. Its operation would thus be largely acci-
dental, sporadic and unpredictable. There might have been, then, the 
second question whether it was desirable to permit a device which sub-
jected prospective lenders in good faith to such hazards and which ex-
cluded some persons from honest business transactions which as a 
practical matter were open to many others. The court may have decided 
that it would be better policy to discourage the use of this security device. 
59. Waring v. W A D S, 327 Pa. 433, 194 At!. 631 (1937). 
60. See Comment (1939) 49 YALE L. J. 559. 
61. 11 F. (2d) 497 (S.D. N. Y. 1935), discussed in Comment (1936) 46 YALE L. ]. 
97; Note (1936) 49 HARv. L. REv. 620; Posner, The Trustee and the Trust lndmturc 
(1937) 46 Yale L. J. 737, 757; Jacob, The Effect of Provisions for Ratable Protcctio11 of 
Debenture Holders in Case of Subsequent Mortgage (1938) 52 HARV. L. REV. 77. 
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But its opinion concerns itself largely with a learned discussion of the 
"overlapping" and "interrelated" doctrines of equitable servitudes on 
land, equitable liens, trusts and specific performance. It demonstrates 
that none of the cases dealt with a situation like the one before the court, 
and that they did not require enforcement of the clause against pledgees. 
But the demonstration was equally effective to show that they did not 
require its non-enforcement. Thus the difficult questions of law and policy 
were still open for decision. 
Now, of course, general ideas, in law as elsewhere, have a power to 
transcend differences in specific situations. But before we enjoy the peace 
of generalizing and systematizing legal theory about the Fair Trade Acts 
and restrictive agreements affecting chattels, it is of first importance to 
pierce the screen of largely fictitious description and theory with which 
judicial and other literature have surrounded the Acts and to seek a fuller 
particular understanding of the various specific restrictions involved. 
